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When, if ever, are our intimate preferences more than simply
"preferences" but a form of discrimination? When we consider and value a
person's physical or personality traits, for example, are we engaging in
discriminatory behavior? Is a preference for slender over heavyset, young
over old, or blue eyes over green a form of discrimination? More
controversial, perhaps, do our intimate preferences for a particular "sex" or
"gender" constitute permissible preferences (or even hard-wired biological
predeterminations) or something more harmful? Even if we were to
theorize about whether our intimate preferences might constitute
"discrimination," what is the utility of such a finding, and how does the law
play a role in the analysis? 1 Would we as a society be willing to allow the
law, in an effort to equalize the dating playing field, to intrude on one of
the most private spheres of the human experience? Would it even be
possible to police intimate preferences, denying people the agency to be
with the type of person they choose (to the extent that we even have a
choice)? Or could we look at the law in a different way, as a source of
discrimination itself rather than an intimate policing tool?
In her work-in-progress, Anti-discrimination Law as Disruption: the
Emergence of a New Paradigm for Understanding and Addressing
Discrimination, Professor Vicki Shultz proposes a novel legal theory -
"the disruption model" - that might be useful in thinking of
"discrimination" on the basis of a particular group identity in the context of
* LL.M. 2009, UCLA School of Law; J.D. 2008, West Virginia University College of
Law; B.A. 2004, West Virginia University. The author would like to thank the following
people for their valuable insights, comments, critiques, and support during this project:
Alexander G. Ruiz , Professor Francis Olsen, Professor Russell Robinson, Professor Anne
M. Lofaso, Michael A. Vaughn, Christopher Yeh, and Jason P. Yun.
1. According to Professor Elizabeth Emens, "[s]tudying the intimate domain permits
new insights into discrimination and the law's identity categories, because people are more
willing to be explicit about identity-based preferences in this domain than in others."
Elizabeth Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in the Accidents of Sex and
Love, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2009).
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the inherently non-neutral intimate context. 2 In her article, Professor
Shultz explains that the disruption model is a means by which we can
disrupt difference-producing dynamics 3 - dynamics in which differences
are:
[c]reated and recreated on a more or less continual basis by the
policies and practices of our institutions and by the social and
psychic interactions that take place within them - all of which
work together in a dynamic way to produce the very differences
that are often regarded as innate or so deeply rooted in "cultural"
practices .. or "societal" discrimination that they are impervious
to change.
She then argues that "the goal of law is not simply to protect
preexisting groups, but rather to police against [these] practices that
actually tend to divide people into dichotomous groups and to create (or at
least contribute to creating) perceived and actual differences between those
groups.",5 In short, the disruption model focuses on and seeks to disrupt the
ways in which institutions - and, more specifically, the law - actually
create and reflect the differences we learn to prefer, and those that correlate
strongly with certain groups of people (e.g., women who legitimately claim
to prefer "feminine" jobs).6
Disruption attempts to more progressively tackle discrimination at a
macro level by focusing on large-scale causal forces rather than individual
actors in a way that traditional theories of anti-discrimination regarding, for
instance, intent and impact do. Ultimately, disruption is both desirable and
achievable because it would not be in the form of a public campaign,
preaching about how individuals should think and feel. Instead, it would
be a subtle litigation- and legislation-intensive project in which various
areas of the law are overhauled in terms of the way they define categories
and create the meanings that subsequently attach. Moreover, it is not the
genuine intimate preference for a particular trait or type of person that is
the impetus for concern. The object of disruption is not to eliminate
preference altogether but to empower individuals in determining and
exploring a variety of preferences. It is therefore the stifling way in which
people and categories are currently defined that must be addressed.
Professor Shultz's disruption model is useful in the following two
ways: (1) it helps reveal the mechanisms by which our preferences are
2. Vicki Shultz, Anti-discrimination Law as Disruption: The Emergence of a New
Paradigm for Understanding and Addressing Discrimination (Dec. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author) [hereinafter Shultz, Disruption].
3. Id. at 20-27.
4. Id. at 20.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 20-21.
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institutionally and socially constructed, thereby diluting many of the claims
suggesting that our intimate preferences are innate, static, and pre-
determined; and (2) it makes the uncomfortable topic of intimate
discrimination - something that we all likely engage in periodically -
more digestible by diminishing our own culpability and placing the onus on
forces far greater than the individual. The disruption model helps to
explain how intimate discrimination is perpetuated by institutional actors
- churches, schools, employers, and the law - and how those actors
create and define the conceptions of sex, masculinity, femininity, and
gendered racial expressions 7 that pervade intimate desire. Application of
the disruption model, therefore, supports the notion that sexuality has the
potential to be more fluid and experimental rather than fixed and static as it
is currently framed. "Sexual orientation" (the gay-straight-bisexual rubric)
ceases to exist as a salient social categorizer given that "sexual
orientation," as this Article discusses below, is itself a bundle of reactions
to constructed conceptions of sex, gender performance, and attraction. This
is not to suggest that, even in a world in which we successfully disrupt the
ways in which institutions construct social categories, people would not
inevitably have intimate preferences for particular traits. Rather, the
disruption model may be useful in dismantling the law's construction and
valuation of social categories as variables in a gendered power hierarchy
that we internalize, pass on, and eroticize. Perhaps allowing individuals to
define for themselves what it means to be a man, woman, masculine,
feminine, gay, or straight would dull these artificial distinctions between
groups, providing more room for intimate experimentation and actual
choice. Perhaps it could even lead to the eroticization of individuality and
power-equality, replacing our current fetishes for domination and
subordination.
In this Article, I will attempt to articulate my own analyses of (and
often internal struggles with) intimate discrimination, whatever
7. For a rich discussion about the gendered undertones of stated racial intimate
preferences, see Russell Robinson, Uncovering Covering, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1809, 1821-
24 (2007) ("[G]ay men of all races make and respond to demands based on masculinity and
femininity and other conceptions of what they think is authentically gay."). Professor
Robinson further claims:
Not infrequently, these rules call on men of color to play up the sexualized
stereotypes ascribed to their racial group. Asian men are expected to play an
effeminate, passive role. By contrast, black men, who are expected to wield
large penises, may play the aggressive "top." Men of color who do not map
onto these categories (because they are aggressive Asian tops, for instance)
are marginalized.
Although race is certainly one of the most salient categories in the intimate realm,
examining how the law creates and assigns meanings to race (including gendered meanings
in particular contexts) is a project currently at the heart of Critical Race Theory. The
constructed nature of race as it relates to intimate preferences, therefore, is a topic so large
that it warrants critical analysis in an independent Article. See, e.g., Russell Robinson,
Racing the Closet, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1463 (2009) and Emens, supra note 1.
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"discrimination" in this context may mean. Although we constantly make
judgments and choices regarding our intimate associations based on many
traits, I seek largely to examine discrimination on the basis of sex and
gender, and to challenge "sexual orientation" as a coherent concept. In Part
II, I will explore the term "discrimination," and analyze whether it - as
understood in traditional theories of anti-discrimination - accurately
maps intimate preferences, or whether a new approach could better address
intimate discrimination. Specifically, I seek to employ Professor Shultz's
disruption model to provide an alternative, less agency-assuming strategy.
In Part III, I will dissect "sexual orientation," examining stated intimate
preferences as they interact with various forms of attraction, sex, and
gender expression. I will highlight several "theories of sexual orientation"
and will discuss the impact of social forces on both the ways we develop
attraction and the conflated categories to which we ultimately become
attracted. Concluding that sexual orientation as a social identity category is
itself a construction largely reflecting existing power structures, the
potential for real intimate choice is thus contingent on our individual ability
to assign value and meaning to traits and people - not by allowing the law
to do it for us.
In Part IV, I will provide examples of the various ways in which the
law as an institution has created our understanding of sex and gender,
particularly focusing on the male-female binary and the expectations of
corresponding sex-typical performance. Jurisprudentially, the focus will be
on sex-based employment discrimination, same-sex sexual harassment,
employer grooming and dress codes, and certain miscellaneous legal
regimes (military regulations, transgender marriage, and legal practices
affecting members of the queer community).
To conclude, I will reiterate the proposition that, while every decision
we make regarding those with whom we choose to be intimate is biased,
partial, and thus "discriminatory" in the traditional sense, to ascribe
individual fault for our preferences is in vain. Only when the law ceases to
reify and create rigid social categories and meanings will we be free to
exercise real intimate choice.
II. DEFINING 'DISCRIMINATION'
As a generally curious and critically minded person, I often find myself
amongst peers having a conversation about dating practices and the types
of partners we seek. In the interest of full disclosure, and to position
myself within my scholarship, I self-identify as a gay man. Intimately, I
have generally described an ideal mate as, among other things, intelligent,
sensitive, and masculine. It is at this last descriptor, "masculine," that I
find myself wincing even as I type. To acknowledge that I am searching
for some enigmatic figure who possesses among his traits something
[Vol. 2 1:1
vaguely identified as "masculinity" evokes personal cognitive dissonance.
As an aspiring civil rights lawyer and a political progressive, the very idea
of attaching personal value to a trait so fraught, oppressive, and exclusively
guarded seems contradictory to my core values. I certainly do not intend
harm, but of course the term "masculine" comes with an array of social
meanings that necessarily excludes some and benefits others.
Yet, when prodded during these friendly conversations with like-
minded peers, I began finding myself simultaneously invoking and
resisting the use of the term "discrimination" as a process that accurately
reflects the choices and preferences that permeate the intimate realm (mine
included). But what was I pushing back against? Was I attempting to
justify my own discriminatory conduct - my unequal treatment of varying
sexes, genders, races, and preferences for certain physical and personality
traits - as a process necessarily involving explicit and implicit biases but
also one that is acceptable because it is private action? Or was it a problem
with the very use of the term "discrimination" as something not clearly
defined - something that, when used to describe intimate preferences, is
not accurately reflected by "discrimination's" use in traditional intent-
based and disparate impact analyses? If so, what does discrimination in
intimate practice mean?
These questions, of course, led to others. If my preference for
masculine men is discrimination, what then does this mean for sexual
attraction in general? Is it ever valid to have preferences for a given
characteristic (sex, gender performance, race, political ideology,
perceptions of beauty, etc.)? Are some preferences not discrimination
(heterosexual preferences for opposite sex partners, for instance) because
they are arguably necessary for the survival of the human species? If
society is willing to concede that differential sex-based treatment is valid
due to its practical outcome, how then do we deal with the inextricable
nature of sex and gender? Explicitly stated preferences for a "masculine"
man or a "feminine" woman are highly common, but they are also
problematic; these preferences often reflect learned biases, borne of
cultural influence, rooted in privilege, power, and hierarchies. Though they
may be problematic, it would be disingenuous to disaggregate these
gender-based preferences from the concept of "sexual orientation." Is
sexual orientation, then, an inherently discriminatory social category?
A. TRADITIONAL MODELS OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Among the various legal regimes most often used to combat
discrimination, Title VII is the hallmark. Title VII is a federal statute
prohibiting "discrimination" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.8 Title VII is a useful tool in analyzing the concept of
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (West 2009).
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discrimination both because of its relatively broad protections9 and
extensive jurisprudential analysis and because, either statutorily or
judicially, it has come to embrace the major theoretical anti-discrimination
mechanisms currently in force. Under Title VII, the term "discrimination"
is a term of art that has come to reflect three distinct doctrines - individual
disparate treatment, systemic disparate treatment, and disparate impact.10
In turn, these three doctrines encompass the more theoretical concepts of
impartiality, perpetuation of past discrimination, and diversity and
accommodation." But what do all of these doctrines and theories mean?
Essentially, Title VII jurisprudence represents "a presumed fundamental
dichotomy between (1) an approach to anti-discrimination law focusing on
whether people are being treated differently, versus (2) an approach
focusing on whether people are being kept down.'
12
Individual disparate treatment and systemic disparate treatment
represent the first strain of anti-discrimination thought by asking whether
an employer intended to discriminate, meaning whether it intended to treat
an individual differently than others based on her protected class.' 3 This
approach presumes that exogenous individual differences exist, and
therefore seeks to deter employers from being partial towards one
identifiable group over another. 14
Disparate impact, then, represents the second strain of anti-
discrimination thought by asking whether an employer, regardless of
intent, has taken action that adversely affects one class of people more than
others without adequate justification.' 5 This approach does not look to
individual actors; instead, it is concerned with whether an identifiable
group of people is being held back or slighted by institutional
disadvantages. While acknowledging group-based differences, it does not
9. Note Title VII does not mention sexual orientation or gender identity; there are
currently no federal protections in place for these categories. Although socially
conservative politics have certainly been the major force in withholding federal protection
from these identity categories, perhaps their exclusion also suggests a human unwillingness
to answer the nagging question presented: What is "sexual orientation" and "gender
identity," and how will we know it when we see it? This uncertainty is precisely the very
thing we should celebrate and seek to protect. This uncertainty may also be why it is
necessary to look beyond traditional legal doctrines and instead to innovative strategies that
contribute to the cultivation and encouragement of individual difference and fluidity.
10. CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2 (Michael J. Zimmer,
Charles A. Sullivan, & Rebecca Hanner White eds., Aspen Publishers 2008) [hereinafter
Zimmer et al.].
11. Shultz, Disruption, supra note 2, at 5-13. Professor Shultz identifies these three
historical paradigms for understanding discrimination.
12. Id.
13. Zimmeret al.,supra note 10.
14. Shultz, Disruption, supra note 2, at 5-9.
15. Zimmer et al., supra note 10, at 207.
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necessarily assume those differences are exogenous; historical and
institutional context is indeed very important.' 6
Examining the Title VII employment discrimination framework as a
model to combat discrimination in the intimate realm demonstrates why a
hypothetical intimate discrimination claim should not require a showing of
either intent or impact. We will first briefly explore the intent standard. In
International Board. of Teamsters v. United States, the Supreme Court
attempted to explain that in disparate treatment cases intent is about
treating "some people less favorably than others because of their race,
religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can usually be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment .... , But this definition, as commentators have noted,18 is
unclear in that it fails to explain what "discriminatory motive" is.
Essentially, the Court defined "discrimination" using a variation of the
word itself. Does discriminatory motive require evidence that negative
animus was a "motivating factor"19 driving the conduct, or is acting on the
basis of implicit bias or unconscious stereotypes sufficient? Would it
matter?
Regardless of what "discriminatory motive" means, any plausible
definition is almost entirely unworkable in addressing intimate
discrimination. Who is to say what factors form a person's intimate
preferences? In fact, the preference-holder likely does not even know.
Human beings are faced with a barrage of stimuli every day starting at
birth. Who we are and what we are interested in is shaped enormously by
our environments. Our backgrounds and experiences influence precisely
with whom we seek intimate relationships. What traits we find ourselves
attracted to is possibly unknowable. 20 Intent-based policing is impractical
and unhelpful because the same stimuli causing negative animus and
unconscious biases will still exist and our internal preferences will not
simply change.
Second, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court explained
disparate impact theory as follows:
16. Shultz, Disruption, supra note 2, at 10-13.
17. 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15 (1977) (emphasis added).
18. Zimmer et al., supra note 10, at 2.
19. Pursuant to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, a plaintiff can successfully prove
discrimination by demonstrating that discriminatory intent was a "motivating factor" in the
adverse action.
20. For a more complete analysis of the unconscious and subconscious forces working to
shape our perceptions, see Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987). "The theory of
cognitive psychology states that the culture - including, for example, the media and an
individual's parents, peers, and authority figures - transmits certain beliefs and
preferences. Because these beliefs are so much a part of the culture, they are not
experienced as explicit lessons."
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The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII... was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers
that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of...
employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms
of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to "freeze" the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.21
While certainly a progressive and egalitarian piece of machinery in the
anti-discrimination arsenal, the disparate impact theory nonetheless falls
short in addressing the real problems implicated by intimate preferences.
While it is certainly true many - people belonging to specific groups face
barriers when they seek intimate associations outside of their particular
group, will this barrier necessarily be one that has "favored" one group
over another? For instance, self-identified gay people most often have
been, and continue to be, screened from straight intimate partners. Yet,
unlike in the employment context, this dating regime does not "favor"
straights over gays; to the contrary, whom they are attracted to is the very
foundation of these particular group identities. Both groups tend to choose
intimate partners who also belong to these corresponding identity groups,
and frankly, while our current categories of social identity remain salient,
compelling a change in this system would be undesirable and quite silly.
Another problem - and, in fact, common criticism - with disparate
impact is that it has an air of charity to it; it has the potential to stigmatize
those groups who benefit because of it.22 Many people begin to associate
the benefiting group with indefinite inferiority or view those group
members as dependent in some way due to the "privilege" they have
received. While claims against the disparate impact approach based on
fears of stigmatization in areas like employment, housing, and schooling
sound hollow, there is a distinct difference in intimate relationships. While
traditional public accommodations that excluded particular groups often
left those groups with either no or very poor alternatives, the same is not
true for groups who remain romantically segregated. Human beings are, in
fact, all equal in value, and the Black man, for instance, who is rebuffed by
the categorically uninterested White woman is not left without other
equally valuable options. To require all Whites to categorically open their
dating doors to all Blacks would send a message that Whites have
something to offer to Blacks that Blacks do not have to offer each other.
21. 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
22. See, e.g., William Bradford Reynolds, Individualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy
of Brown, 93 YALE L. J. 983, 1003 (1984) (arguing that "the more insistent government is
on the use of racial preferences - whether in the form of quotas, goals, or any other
numerical device - to correct what is perceived as an 'imbalance' . . . the more radically
polarized society becomes [because] [s]uch a selection process inevitably encourages us to
stereotype our fellow human beings ... ").
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For these reasons, the stigmatization argument is sound in the intimate
context, and disparate impact would be ineffective and harm producing.
Articulated above is a short summary and application of some of the
traditional theories of discrimination as they are defined in the employment
setting. While the descriptions barely scratch the surface of jurisprudential
analysis, they adequately frame the issue of what intimate "discrimination"
might mean using the mechanisms currently available to us. Yet they all
operate under the assumption that real differences between groups exist -
they fail to address the difference-producing systems that inform the
categories and groups to which we ultimately become attracted. These
traditional anti-discrimination mechanisms place an enormous burden on
the individual to "correct" exclusionary or harmful preferences, yet leave
those systems in place which rigidly divide and ascribe meaning to us.
B. THE DISRUPTION MODEL OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
Certainly, individuals often claim an intimate preference for a
particular race, sex, or gender. As we currently think of social identity
categories, differences based on race, sex, or gender do currently exist.
But, as explained more thoroughly in Part III, these categories are often not
real in a predetermined, innate, or even biological sense. Rather, the
differences between these categories are largely created and recreated on a
continual basis by the policies and practices of our institutions and by the
social and psychic interactions that take place within them - all of which
work together in a dynamic way to produce the very differences that are
often regarded as innate or so deeply rooted in "cultural" practices ... or
"societal" discrimination that they are impervious to change.
Is it possible, then, that we as humans have limited our potential
for romantic combinations by leaving unquestioned an institutional
system that actually creates salient differences between groups -
differences that we learn, perform, ascribe particular values to, and
ultimately factor into our intimate equations?
23
For example, "woman" is an obviously loaded term, and even more
obviously loaded is the corollary term "feminine." We universally
understand these terms to have particular meanings (allowing for, of
course, slight variations from individual to individual), and these meanings
are a product of the society in which we live. We are not born knowing
these categories and their meanings; religion, schools, families, the media,
among other things, have all contributed to defining for us what being
"feminine" or a "woman" means. Thus, when a straight man states he has
an intimate preference for a feminine woman, his preference is not merely a
manifestation of his biological hard-wiring or of evolutionary engineering,
23. See Shultz, Disruption, supra note 2, at 20.
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but a reflection of a learned affinity for particular social markers and
meanings.
To be clear, I am not making the oft-made anti-gay argument that
human sexuality is a choice (and that gays have made the wrong one). In
fact, I am suggesting quite the opposite. By allowing institutions to be the
entities that create differences between particular groups of humans, rather
than deciding on our own terms what being a "feminine woman" means (to
the extent those terms would even continue to be relevant in a disrupted
world), we are stripped of any real agency in our intimate partner selections
because we are constantly constrained - perhaps both consciously and not
by the categories and combinations created for us. Perhaps if individuals
had the freedom to choose for themselves what being a man, a woman, gay,
straight, feminine, masculine, Black, or Asian means, and whether they
would even like to be identified by those categories at all, our behavioral
and aesthetic expectations of people would cease to be rigid and
preordained. We may begin to feel freer and even develop attraction for
more "atypical" persons. Disrupting the institutional processes that create
differences leads to greater autonomy and a valuation of individuality.
Greater valuation of individuality leads to greater equality. And, in turn,
perhaps equality, rather than power and hierarchies, may begin to become
sexy and eroticized.
So how does society go about disrupting the categories that permeate
our intimate preferences? And would this disruption be deemed too
"radical," "liberal," or "p.c.," to actually garner support, especially given
the American cultural backdrop of a society that is currently obsessed with
policing people's behavior as it matches their given social identity
markers? Though only a starting point, I propose disrupting the legal
institution is an easily accessible route for achieving this kind of social
change. The law is an institution uniquely situated to construct, and as
such it is also uniquely accessible to disruption in a very real, less
theoretical, way - it trickles down on popular opinion, values, and what
we consider to be right and wrong.24
Under a disruption model, anti-discrimination is not merely concerned
with individual animus, unconscious stereotypes, a history of past
discrimination, disparate impact, or any other traditional mechanism by
which we currently seek social change through legal tools (although all, of
course, continue to play roles). Intimate discrimination is thus the "process
24. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Brown decision
stands out in the legal canon as one of the most influential opinions in history. While
initially met with intense resistance, it has arguably had the most powerful and direct effect
on public opinion regarding de jure segregation and basic human rights (bolstered by the
power of its unanimous support from the bench). A majority of American society today
would find it unthinkable to officially segregate students on the basis of race, and it is
reasonable to speculate that Brown played a significant, if not leading, role in creating this
new public morality.
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of creating or replicating[,] making race or gender differences real or
salient by casting people into preconceived notions of which group they
'belong to' .. . and assigning that group a particular set of pre-conceived
traits, characteristics, or meanings" which we then apply in deciding whom
we intimately prefer.25 And for the purposes of this Article, the difference-
producing process we will disrupt is the law, specifically in its rigid,
hierarchical, and oppressive construction of sex, gender, and sexual
orientation.
III. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AS A SOCIALLY
CONSTRUCTED CATEGORY
As mentioned above, the genesis for this Article was largely my own
realization that my stated preference for "masculine" men is somehow
personally troubling. I began to wonder, what is it that I mean when I say
"masculine," why do I find it attractive, and how does my intimate
preference for it negatively affect those whom I arbitrarily decide do not fit
the mold? Initially, I strongly believed such stated preferences were not
discriminatory because, as I will argue below, they are an inextricable
element of sexual orientation. As my own analysis progressed, however,
the inherent injustice of a system in which people are excluded from dating
opportunities outright on the basis of their gender performance began to
cause discomfort; certainly, to be on the receiving end of such exclusion
can be bewildering and painful. But, perhaps because I clung so strongly to
the belief that sexual orientation is not a "choice," I remained unable to
reconcile my unalterable desire for a particular type of person with my
otherwise strong devotion to social justice. After all, I reasoned, would the
opponents of expressed preferences for a particular gender performance
extend the argument against expressed preferences for a particular
biological or anatomical sex? Do we really want a society in which
everyone is compelled to be pansexual?
What I quickly realized, however, was that I too am imprisoned by the
current regime of illusory social categories institutionally created for us.
Chief among the categories currently limiting individual choice is our
baseline concept of "sexual orientation." What is sexual orientation, how
does it constrain us, and can we disrupt it?
A. DEFINING SEXUAL ORIENTATION
When the general public discusses "sexual orientation," people often
ask whether sexual orientation is "a choice" or something a person is born
with; many liberal advocacy groups, such as the National Gay and Lesbian
Task Force, adamantly argue that sexual orientation is immutable, while
religious conservatives tend to argue that "homosexuality" is chosen (and
25. Shultz, Disruption, supra note 2, at 27.
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many even encourage treatment to help people overcome that "choice").26
The debate rages on, and scientists are now diligently searching for
answers. 27 My aim is not to solve the scientific and political debate over
the genetics of sexuality and attraction. Instead, my aim is to highlight the
overly simplistic way in which the debate is being framed, and to break
down and disrupt sexual orientation's (as we currently understand it)
various parts.
After all, can we really know whether "sexual orientation" is a
"choice" without understanding the components of sexual orientation?
What is it, after all, that we are choosing? Discussions of sexual
orientation tend to presume the existence and validity of the male-female
binary and seemingly regard a person's attraction to a particular "sex" as
the cornerstone in determining whether someone is gay or straight. But
these are all just words created and defined by other people. What is sex?
What is male, and what is female? How do preferences for expressions of
gender play into the analysis? What even is gender? And further, what is
attraction? Is there a difference between sexual attraction and romantic
attraction, and can the two exist independently? In posing these questions,
it is not my intention to frustrate readers with legalistic, rhetorical games.
It is my intention, rather, to call attention to the intricate nature of human
sexuality, and to expose the shortsighted articulation of "sexual
orientation" currently espoused by parties on both sides of the debate. In
reality, sexual orientation is an incoherent concept composed of many
elements that are in and of themselves illusory.
1. Attraction and Desire
There is considerable scholarship devoted to theories of "sexual
orientation" and its many facets, yet there is hardly a consensus as to what
it is and how we come to have it. What these theories tend to have in
common, however, is that all seem to support the notion that "sexual
orientation," broadly defined, includes a strong social dimension.
In one study, researchers defined sexual orientation as consisting of
three components: sexual behavior, sexual identity, and sexual desire.28
The study explains, "[s]exual behavior refers to the overt actions of an
individual," "[s]exual identity refers to how an individual labels him or
26. Robert Epstein, Sexuality and Choice, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, Apr./May, 2006,
at 16-17, available at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=sexuality-and-ch
oice (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
27. See, e.g., David France, The Science of Gaydar, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Jun. 18, 2007,
available at http://nymag.com/news/features/33520/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2009) (examining
research regarding hair whorls, voice pitch, and other traits that some experts theorize serve
as biological markers for sexual orientation).
28. Richard Lippa & Sara Arad, The Structure of Sexual Orientation and Its Relation to
Masculinity, Femininity, and Gender Diagnosticity: Different for Men and Women, 37 SEX
ROLES 187, 192 (1997) [hereinafter Lippa & Arad, Structure].
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herself," and "[s]exual desire refers to an individual's sexual attractions,
whether or not they are acted upon., 29 The study then suggests that sexual
behavior and sexual identity are far more likely than sexual desire to be
influenced by social pressures and cultural norms, whereas sexual desire is
likely to be an essential part of a person's disposition.3 ° While the tripartite
structure of sexual orientation is an intriguing theory that may very well
make good sense, what this particular study does not explain is, "sexual
desire" for what? In its research method, it falls prey to the typical pitfalls
of assessing "sexual orientation" by posing questions to survey participants
which include institutionally created social identity categories in the
questions (asking participants, for instance, to rate their attraction to "men"
and "women").3
Other studies have attempted to dig deeper into questions of attraction
and desire - both what we desire and why. One study boldly begins its
summary of findings by emphatically stating, "sexual orientation is about
much more than sex. Although individuals are typically classified as
lesbian, gay, or bisexual on the basis of their sexual desires, it is widely
believed that sexual orientation has an affectional component as well. 32
The study's basic thesis is that sexual orientation - "the tendency to seek
partners of the same gender, the other gender, or both genders" 33 - does
not fundamentally circumscribe the class of individuals with whom one can
fall in love.34 The study notes, "although sexual desire and romantic love
are often experienced in concert, they are governed by different social-
behavioral systems that evolved to serve different goals. 35  In fact,
although love and desire are functionally independent, and most people do
experience powerful interconnections between these two unique
experiences, the link between the two is affected by cultural norms that
send "strong messages regarding what types of feelings and behaviors are
appropriate with different social partners. 36 In sum, this theory supports
the notion that any human is capable of forming affectional bonds with any
other human, and that sexual desire can potentially develop as a result of
29. Lippa & Arad, Structure at 192-93.
30. Id. at 193.
31. Id.
32. Lisa M. Diamond, What Does Sexual Orientation Orient? A Biobehavioral Model
Distinguishing Romantic Love and Sexual Desire, 110 PSYCHOL. REv. 173, 177 (2003).
33. Unfortunately, the study does not define "gender."
34. Diamond, supra note 32, at 174 ("[Allthough sexual desire and romantic love are
often experienced in concert, they are governed by different social-behavioral systems that
evolved to serve different goals.").
35. Id.
36. Id. at 175.
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falling in love - even those desires that run counter to a person's sexual
orientation.37
While the two studies summarized above provide different definitions
of sexual orientation, they are hardly inconsistent. If desire is innate, and
yet can also develop as the result of falling in love (interestingly, "love"
was not an intrinsic component in either definition), then a logical
extension of both theories is that we have the innate ability to desire
literally anyone. As noted in both studies, however, cultural norms often
temper our ability to explore feelings and impulses for people we have
been conditioned to believe we ought not have feelings or impulses for.
Arguably, one such cultural device that impedes our ability to form
affectional, and potentially romantic, bonds is the very existence of "sexual
orientation" as a classifying device. When weighed down by the threat of
entering dubious sexual orientation status (is he or isn't he?), many people
who might otherwise enjoy exploring their potential for various intimate
preferences are stifled by the fear of societal rebuke and the stigma of
deviancy. The construction of the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and straight social
identifiers, therefore, succeeds in exacerbating and creating perceived
differences between people. Those created differences, in turn, rigidly
inform our dating pools and tend to foreclose cross-group experimentation.
This is merely one example of how difference-creating processes render the
question of "choice" and "sexual orientation" a fruitless topic for debate.
One final theory worth noting regarding sexual orientation and its
relation to attraction and desire is called "Exotic Becomes Erotic., 38 In
many ways, this theory represents the perfect manifestation of how
institutions successfully create differences that result in intimate
discrimination. The theory looks at the temporal sequence of events that
leads to a person's sexual orientation, and it does so by explicitly
incorporating the effects of "a culture that emphasizes the differences
between the sexes by pervasively organizing both the perceptions and
realities of communal life around the male-female dichotomy., 39  The
theory sets forth the following developmental sequence of events: (1)
biological variables code for certain childhood temperaments (aggression
or activity level); (2) a child's temperament predisposes him or her to enjoy
37. Diamond, supra note 32, at 177 ("Contemporary passionate friendships may be more
common among women than among men because of differences in normative standards for
male-male and female-female standards.").
38. Daryl J. Bern, Exotic Becomes Erotic: A Developmental Theory of Sexual Orientation,
103 PSYCHOL. REv. 320, 321 (1996).
39. Bem, supra note 38, at 321. These findings were also supported in a subsequent
study of the preferences of gay men and lesbians. See Michael J. Bailey, et al., Butch,
Femme, or Straight Acting? Partner Preferences of Gay Men and Lesbians, 73 J. PERS.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 960, 965 (1997) (finding that the "category of peers from whom gay men
and lesbians may have felt different as a child - those of their own sex who best fit gender
stereotypes - are the ones to whom they are the most attracted to as adults.").
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certain activities, and the child will prefer to play with others who enjoy the
same activities; (3) children who do not prefer sex-typical activities will be
gender non-conforming and those children will feel different from same-
sex peers, perceiving them as dissimilar, unfamiliar, and exotic; (4) feelings
of dissimilarity and unfamiliarity produce heightened autonomic arousal
around same-sex peers; and (5) that autonomic arousal is later transformed
into erotic or romantic attraction.40
This theory is especially subject to criticism, however, due to its
inability to explain why feelings of difference in other contexts do not
produce similar exotic-to-erotic feelings. For instance, we certainly feel
different from other animals, but humans typically do not eroticize that
difference (with exceptions, of course). Nonetheless, the theory is at the
very least interesting because it, like those presented above, ascribes
tremendous weight to malleable societal factors as they contribute to the
formation of our identities. What is more fascinating about this theory,
perhaps, and why I find it particularly intriguing, is that its focus is largely
on attraction to the performance of gender rather than merely the "sex" of
an individual. Gender, unlike sex, is uniquely constructed and absent
biological underpinnings, our perceptions of gender and "proper" gender
roles are constantly shifting as a result of changing societal norms. Thus, if
gender, which is created by difference-producing institutions as opposed to
sex - also in some ways created by difference-producing institutions
though arguably more biology based - plays such a large role in defining
our "sexual orientation," then the disruption of sexual orientation and its
gender (and sex) components has the potential to fundamentally alter the
way our "sexual orientation" is formed.
2. Sex as an Identity Category
In exploring the relationship between gender typology, sex, and sexual
attraction, one study interestingly concluded that both "sex" and "gender"
are independent components of sexual attraction which operate separate
and apart from each other.4 ' In defining gender, the study validated social
constructionism and explained, "gender is embedded in apparent sexual
dimorphism, from which human reflection elaborates identities, roles,
stereotypes, and specific gender asymmetries for each sex.",42 In defining
sex, however, the study relied on traditional explanations regarding
biology, wherein sex "refers to a complex reality rooted in biology (sexual
chromosomes, sexual hormones, internal and external sexual organs,
40. Bem, supra note 38, at 321.
41. Juan Fernandez, Maria Angeles Quiroga & Isabel Del Olmo, Is There Any
Relationship Between Sexual Attraction and Gender Typology?, 9 SPANISH J. OF
PSYCHOLOGY 1, 7 (2006) [hereinafter Quiroga & Del Olmo, Typology].
42. Id. at 4.
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cerebral dimorphism) and that inevitably leads to psychological
development throughout life."43
But sex, in fact, is far more nuanced. In the media, in everyday
discourse, and even in legal jurisprudence and scholarship, people seldom
ask what "sex" means. Undeniably, there are true biological differences
between most anatomic females and males, largely reproduction-related.
And most of us - based on our birth certificate designations, and by self-
observation of our genitalia, secondary sex features, and reproductive
capacities - embrace our classification as male or female. But, in fact,
many people do not have the luxury of automatic sex identity, or even an
unambiguous biological sex. Many others feel as though they were born as
the "wrong" sex and undergo medical procedures to change it. Thus, a
definition of sex that is rooted purely in biology excludes persons who do
not fit neatly into the male-female binary.4
The male-female binary is even further fraught because terms like
"'sex," ".male," and "female" come not only with biological implications,
but also strongly embedded social and performative meanings.45 Yet not
all people agree as to what those meanings are. As Judith Butler explains,
"[t]he very subject of women is no longer understood in stable or abiding
terms... [and] there is very little agreement after all on what it is that
constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of women., 46 Butler and
others argue that the term "woman" is not exhaustive and self-executing
because sex and gender are inextricably linked - sexed bodies cannot
signify without gender, and "gender is not always constituted coherently or
consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects
with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities of discursively
constituted identities. 47 Thus, for one to claim an intimate preference for
"women" reveals far more than that person's intimate preference for a
particular chromosomal variation; it signifies a preference for a certain
biological and phenotypical makeup plus the corresponding performative
43. Quiroga & Del Olmo, Typology, supra, note 41, at 4.
44. See Phyllis Randolph Frye & Alyson Dodi Meiselman, Same-Sex Marriages Have
Existed Legally in the United States for a Long Time Now, 64 ALB. L. REV. 1031, 1053-54
(2001) (arguing that a legal test that defines chromosomes as the immutable characteristic to
be used in determining a person's sex fails to take into consideration the chromosomal
deviations of people who are intersexed). See also Jennifer M. Ross-Amato, Transgender
Employees & Restroom Designation - Goins v. West Group, Inc., 29 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 569, 589-90 (2002) ("Not all transgender people define themselves similarly. The
transgender community includes people who understand themselves to be of the opposite
sex from which their genitals would suggest and seek to become physically, socially, and
legally the sex they have always been psychologically.").
45. For a legal application of the principle, see generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (finding that discriminating on the basis of gender nonconformity is
discrimination on the basis of "sex" under Title VII).
46. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 1
(Routledge 1990).
47. Id. at 3.
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manifestations of gender as it intersects with other desired social markers.
To isolate sex and gender, then, would be to create a false binary. Because
societal institutions have so successfully mapped particular performative
expectations onto our sexed bodies, individuals alone, despite how
progressively minded, will not likely be able to shed assumptions regarding
gender performance because implicit biases often result due to the natural
process by which humans develop categorization and identification skills.48
We categorize based on the stereotypes available to us.
Having identified some of the problems with the male-female binary,
the difficulties in defining "sex" as a component of "sexual orientation"
clearly emerge. Simply put, sexual orientation cannot merely be the sexual
preference for one biological or anatomical sex over another because sex
and gender are both constructed and inseparable. Even the organization of
this Article reflects a false reality in that it attempts to explore the two
categories independently. Nonetheless, situating a discussion of intimate
preferences for categories of gender performance following an explanation
of the convoluted meaning of sex will perhaps demonstrate how intimate
discrimination is in fact something we as a society should care about. As I
will argue, a straight woman's or a gay man's intimate preference, for
example, for "masculine" men showcases how institutions not only create
differential meanings for different social categories, but also ascribe
harmful hierarchical values to these meanings and categories that we learn
and employ. This, in turn, leads to the machismo, misogamy, and racism
that currently permeate the dating market.
3. 'Gender Performance' as an Identity Category
In light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,49 it is unlikely that many employers will feel free to comment that
a female employee should "walk femininely, talk more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry., 50 Yet, just because an
employer might think twice before making such an overt comment to a
female employee due to litigation fears does not suggest that an employer
would not still prefer these things in female employees. It certainly does
not suggest that he or she would not prefer such a "feminine" woman as a
potential intimate partner. While the law has been relatively successful in
eliminating overt institutional discrimination, overt private discrimination
is very much alive, and, in fact, uniquely thrives in the dating market. 51
48. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995) (arguing that
stereotypes operate below the level of cognition, and that they are the consequence of
humans' necessity to categorize sensory perceptions to understand the world).
49. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
50. Id. at 272 (finding that such comments amounted to prohibited sex-stereotyping
under Title VII).
51. See generally Emens, supra note 1.
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Personal advertisements and online dating profiles, for example, are rife
with explicit, category based preferences and exclusionary policies.
52
Common in these ads and online dating profiles, particularly in the queer
community, are specific references to desired and undesired gender
performances: "no butches," "no ferns," "masculine only," "masc 4 masc,"
etc. In fact, studies have shown that gay men and lesbians claim they are
most sexually attracted to sex-typical partners, and gay men as a group
show a strong bias for masculine characteristics.5 3  The question then
becomes: What does it mean to be sex-typical, to be a "masculine" man or
a "feminine" woman? Although these terms have no universal meaning,
another social identity category is often used as a guide: "straight-acting."
"Straight-acting" is a "slang term typically used to describe
homosexuals who do not fit the stereotype that homosexuals are gender
nonconformists. It refers to appearance, dress, mannerisms, language,
interests, and even entertainment choices. It describes persons who are
thought to have gender-conforming traits in one or more of these areas. 54
Thus, to be a "masculine" man or a "feminine" woman is largely defined in
opposition to those traits associated with being gay. For the lesbian who
prefers feminine intimate partners, then, the preference seems almost
paradoxical. Expectedly, significant criticism has been levied at those
members of the queer community who self-describe as "straight acting" or
who explicitly seek such a partner. Some argue that gay people who are
insecure about their sexuality use the term to make themselves acceptable
to their straight peers. 55 Others argue that glorification of the "straight-
acting" ideal suggests there is something wrong with being gay. 56 Still
others find the term insulting and degrading because it devalues
individuality and non-conformity, and it specifically disrespects those
highly visible, non-conforming gays who pioneered the gay rights
movement.57
For the purposes of this Article, it is not my intention to criticize those
who have positively used these and other gendered terms in either their
self-descriptions or intimate preferences. After all, the very definition of
intimate discrimination that I set forth seeks to take the blame off of the
individual for feelings and desires they alone are likely ill equipped to
change. Instead, my intent is twofold. First, I hope that, by highlighting
52. See Russell Robinson, Structural Dimensions of Romantic Preferences, 76 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2787 (2008) (noting that sites like match.corn prompt users to explicitly which races
they will and will not date).
53. Bailey, supra note 39, at 970.
54. Dale Carpenter, Straight Acting, 9 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 803, 804 (2008) (As the
author notes, there is even a dating website designed for gay men with the domain name
straightacting.com.).
55. Id. at 806.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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the pervasiveness of expressed intimate preferences for "gender-
conforming" characteristic - "gender conforming" being significantly
equated with heterosexual - the conflated and interrelated nature of sex,
gender performance, and sexual orientation will become apparent. Sexual
orientation is traditionally understood as attraction for one sex over
another, but sex has been socially constructed to include gender
performance, and gender performance denotes a set of characteristics
associated with sexual identity. If that equation seems confusing, it is
meant to be.
Second, I argue for the absolute necessity of the disruption of these
categories by humbly positing a novel theory regarding sexual orientation,
sex, gender and desire. As we continue to allow institutions like the law to
define and give meanings to our social categories, we also allow them to
assign value to those social categories which we then internalize and pass
on. The makers of the law and the law itself have placed the highest
premium on power, and they have repeatedly created and differentiated
between groups for the purpose of bestowing or taking away that power.
Throughout history, American law has defined who can own property
(White men), who can become naturalized citizens (Whites but certainly
not Asians), who can vote (White male property holders), who is protected
from employment discrimination (no one who is LGBT), who can attend
military institutions (no one who is LGBT or a woman), who can be on the
front lines in combat (not women), who can serve openly in the military
(Whites, then Blacks, then women, but still no one LGBT), who can attend
high quality public schools (not poor people).
We have had little choice but to internalize these values by merely
being subject to the American legal system, and now we too place a high
premium on power - albeit a premium that may only exist deep in our
subconscious. We have internalized these values in ways that often deny
us our dignity and further disempower us, ways that have instilled within
us, at times, poor self-esteem and self-loathing. We have constantly
struggled to survive and get ahead in a society obsessed with something
possessed and wielded by so relatively few. Our evolutionary instinct for
self-perpetuation has driven us to behave in ways that maximize our
potential to gain and possess power. This has meant conforming to modes
of behavior expected of us by those who have the power to divide us into
distinct categories. It has meant that men must act like men, women must
act like women, Blacks and other racial minorities must not impinge on
White privilege, and that the poor must not take what rightfully belongs to
the rich. While conforming to these expected modes of behavior certainly
does nothing to alter the existing power hierarchy, deviating from them
could cost a person what little power she possesses as an obedient subject.
It makes sense, then, that one trait we find attractive is power, even if
we are not always self-aware. Perhaps the lesbian who only intimately
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prefers "lipstick lesbians" has internalized the institutional value judgment
that feminine means straight and straight is better than gay. After all,
society, and specifically the law, has reinforced the categories of sexual
identity by affording "straight" persons infinitely more prestige and, quite
literally, rights. But if we were to disrupt the law and prevent it from
rigidly assigning people into social identity boxes, and therefore prevent it
from assigning people who are in those social identity boxes a correlating
performative expectation, then maybe those traits we currently associate
with power and desirability would cease to carry such a connotation. 58 Of
course, when permitted to craft our own categories, meanings, and
identities, there is nothing stopping us from erecting an entirely different
internal hierarchy that we unconsciously learn to eroticize. But if it is we
as individuals who dictate the terms on which we form our intimate
preferences rather than the law and other social institutions, then this is real
choice.
Before moving to Part IV, in which I will attempt to show how the law
currently creates our sexual categories of intimate preferences, I would like
to offer a personal narrative regarding the interdependence of sexual
orientation, sex, and gender. This story is about my interactions with a
man who explicitly states his intimate preferences for hyper-masculine
men, and what hyper-masculinity means to him. This example serves to
illustrate the often misogynistic effects of the institutional valuation of
masculinity and devaluation of femininity.
B. SEXUAL ORIENTATION, SEX, GENDER, AND THE VALUATION OF
MASCULINITY: A NARRATIVE
I met Nick when I was young, identified as straight, and was
romantically involved with a woman. He, conversely, was an openly gay
man. I was instantly attracted to him (although I refused to acknowledge
the attraction as sexual), and we quickly became close friends. Then,
almost as quickly, we became something more than that when our
relationship became physical. All the while, I continued to emphatically
identify as straight, and would only concede that, "no one is 100 percent
anything." But the relationship was by no means purely sexual; he and I
were spending every day together, and we eventually became roommates.
It took a full year, but I finally surfaced from the entrenched anti-gay
indoctrination I learned from my upbringing and "came out" both to myself
and to Nick. I asked him to be in a romantic relationship with me, and,
after some serious thought, he agreed. Almost immediately, the physical
58. It is unclear, however, and in fact seems unlikely, that eliminating these categories
would change humans' baseline preference for particular body types and the cognitive and
physiological reactions they cause. To make that argument would be to dismiss legitimate
biological facets of human sexuality that neither I nor the scientists who research these
issues can yet explain.
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element began to change for the worse. To remain interested in "us," he
often watched pornography (generally featuring "straight jocks") to
supplement our physical relationship, and he increasingly became more
distant. We lasted a full year as a couple, but, by the end, the physical
element was entirely gone.
Nick and I have remained close friends since dating, and I know much
more about his intimate preferences now than then. Sexuality and
attraction are subjects we frequently talk about. Although he generally
downplays its influence, Nick initially became sexually interested in me
largely because I identified as, and acted, straight. This pattern persists in
the men he now becomes sexually interested in, in the males he "checks
out" when we are out somewhere together, and in the pornography he
prefers. Nick's intimate type is typically a muscular man with a sharp jaw
line who shows few to no outward signs of homosexuality. He focuses on
men who display and value stereotypically "straight" qualities; for instance,
wearing sports and gym paraphernalia, having tattoos, sporting an army-
style haircut, and showing an interest in playing or watching competitive
sports. Intellectually, he has stated that, "they don't have to be smart," and,
in fact, sometimes too much intellect can be a negative. In the past when I
suggested he try dating again, or I comment on an openly gay male that I
find attractive, he would respond, "I'm not interested in gay men. I just
don't usually find them attractive." Sometimes he claims, "I just want a
guy who will use me for sex," or he will poke fun at me for being interested
in "intellectual, emotional men."
Nick self-identifies as gay, and has, to his knowledge, always been
exclusively sexually interested in men. But clearly, for him, being
interested in "men" is something much more than having a sexual attraction
for a biologically and anatomically male body. Aesthetically, only those
male bodies that typify the commonly understood image of the hyper-male
pique his interest. It is only the combination of that physically hyper-male
body with a corresponding hyper-male gender expression that he is
sexually attracted to.59 Thus, Nick's sexual orientation inextricably hinges
on both socially constructed perceptions of masculine gender performance
and masculine body type - "masculine" signifying those traits standing
opposed to his perceptions of femaleness, femininity, and gay identity.
Certainly, Nick's sexual orientation embraces harmful stereotypes that
tend to reflect typical misogynistic conceptions of power. He also
explicitly acknowledges these negatives, and truly does not intend to harm
any person or class of persons. But he is powerless to change his
preferences because the categories (and their corresponding meanings) he
59. This is not to suggest that I fit the mold of the hyper-male when Nick was sexually
interested in me. But there are many proxies for "masculinity" and, for him, identifying as
"straight" is near the top of the list.
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is attracted to have been created for him, internalized, and eroticized. He,
like the rest of us, is trapped by the current categories available to us for
intimate associations.
IV. DISRUPTING THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF SEX
GENDER, AND SEXUALITY, AND THE RESULTING
POTENTIAL FOR REAL INTIMATE CHOICE
I hope by now I have demonstrated the value in fundamentally altering
our system in which we allow institutions to divide, define, and create
artificial differences between us. But while the proposed project may strike
many as intriguing, many others are undoubtedly skeptical. Phrases like
"difference-creating institutions" and "socially constructed" are generally
abstract ideas without tangible meanings, and the prospect of identifying or
changing those ideas sounds more like an academic exercise than a
practical reality. Truly, many of our "difference-creating institutions" are
so culturally valued and engrained that their disruption may not ever be
fully achievable (or desirable); religion, particularly, is an area far too
insulated and guarded to fundamentally disrupt the ways in which it creates
difference - the Judeo-Christian creation story is, after all, premised on
the "man" and "woman" dichotomy. If some institutions are too rigid in
their structure and belief systems, then what is the point? The point, I
suggest, is disrupting institutions where we can create trickle-down effects
elsewhere. For instance, before the Civil Rights movement, many
American religious sects perceived Blacks and Latinos (among others) as
sinful or unfit to attend particular religious ceremonies.6 ° While religious
attitudes regarding racial minorities have not universally changed for the
better, the social validation and extension of many civil rights to Blacks
and others in the late twentieth century has brought about significant
progress within some churches.6'
One such difference-creating institution that is accessible and primed
for disruption is the law. The law not only reflects societal values and
understandings, but it powerfully shapes them. The law, as I will show, is
also deeply invested in the project of creating and defining social identity
categories. I will provide several examples of the way in which the law has
created and rigidly defined sex, and, consequently, gender and sexuality.
In tandem with exposing the law's difference-creating machinery, I also
hope to show how ultimately creating a legal jurisprudence devoid of
60. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints, Official Declaration-2
(1978), http://scriptures.lds.org/en/od/2 (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
61. See id. (declaring in 1978 that, despite previously excluding Blacks from Priesthood
ordination and participation in temple ceremonies, the President of The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, having received a revelation from God, extended the priesthood
and temple ordinances to all worthy male members).
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preordained social categories and meanings will contribute to intimate
flexibility and choice.
A. SEX-BASED EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
As articulated in Part III, sex, gender, and sexuality are illusory terms
used to describe things which are not inherently different. Yet legislatures
and the courts have consistently constituted these categories as divorced
and in opposition to each other. I will begin the discussion by examining
one of the areas of the law most replete with analyses of these categories.
In the employment context, employers, courts, and legislatures have
been exceedingly instrumental in defining what it means to be a man or a
woman, and what respective roles these two sexes play. Even today, it is
still very much the case that, more often than not, "men work mostly with
men, doing 'men's work,' and women work mostly with women, doing
'women's work.' ' 62 Although this statement reflects a true "difference"
between men and women regarding the type of employment they currently
seek, is this difference real in the sense that men and women are born
genetically predisposed towards particular types of jobs? In one of the
most canonical employment discrimination decisions, EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly answered
yes by validating a new weapon in employers' defense arsenals when
employment decisions are made based on women's "lack of interest.,
63
In Sears, the EEOC argued that Sears engaged in a nationwide pattern
or practice of discrimination against women by reserving higher-paying
commission sales jobs mostly for men while assigning women to lower-
paying non-commission sales jobs.64 Sears countered with evidence
showing that men and women were simply not equally interested in the
commission jobs.6 5  The court ultimately found Sears's evidence
persuasive, and agreed that:
[F]emale applicants who indicated an interest in sales most often
were interested in selling soft lines of merchandise, such as
clothing, jewelry, and cosmetics, items generally not sold on
62. See Vicki Shultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex-Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. REv. 1749, 1751 (1990) (also noting that "women's work" pays lower wages,
has less status, and fewer opportunities for advancement than "men's work") [hereinafter
Schultz, Telling Stories].
63. 839 F.2d 302, 320 (7th Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 307; Shultz, Telling Stories, supra note 62, at 1752.
65. Sears, 839 F.2d. at 312-13 (presenting evidence "consisting of testimony by Sears
store managers, personnel managers, and other store officials, a study based on interviews of
women in nontraditional jobs at Sears, national surveys and polls regarding the changing
status of women in American society, morale surveys of Sears employees and 1976 and
1982 job interest surveys of Sears employees, national labor force data, and an analysis of
the Applicant Interview Guides that attempts to measure differences in interest among men
and women.").
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commission at Sears. Male applicants were more likely to be
interested in hard lines, such as hardware, automotive, sporting
goods and the more technical goods, which are more likely to be
sold on commission at Sears ... [and] [m]en ... were usually not
interested in fashions, cosmetics, linens, women's or children's
clothing, and other household small ticket items. Women usually
lacked interest in selling automotives and building supplies, men's
clothing, furnaces, fencing and roofing.... Women at Sears who
were not interested in commission sales expressed a variety of
reasons for their lack of interest. Some feared or disliked the
perceived "dog-eat-dog" competition.... Many expressed a
preference for noncommission selling because it was more
enjoyable and friendly.66
While the Sears case is certainly the most famous example of the
application of employers' "lack of interest" defense to sex-based
employment discrimination claims, it is by no means an outlier. As of
1990, in fact, "[a]lmost half the courts to consider the issue have accepted
this explanation and attributed women's disadvantaged place in the
workplace to their own lack of interest in more highly valued nontraditional
jobs. 67 Though judicially popular and factually supported, the "lack of
interest" defense is problematic because it fails to ask the crucial question:
why? To the extent employers accurately present evidence that women and
men claim explicit, sex-specific preferences for particular jobs, what
creates these preferences, and why do the courts defer to them? What have
employers done to market certain jobs towards men and women? What has
the work environment historically been like for women who dare to do
"men's work?" This type of deferral, asserting a supposed truth without
dissecting the institutional forces at play that men tend to choose
"masculine" jobs and women tend to choose "feminine" jobs, itself reifies
and creates difference. This is one example of a place where we can
disrupt the law's construction of masculinity, femininity, men, and women.
What, then, would disruption here look like here? Interestingly, we
already have a clear, judicial answer. In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
courts addressed employers' arguments that failure to promote or hire
Black workers was due to those workers' "lack of interest., 68 Dismissing
employers' arguments about the lack of Black interest, courts reasoned a
statistical lack of interest evinced nothing more than a feeling of futility in
applying because of employers' history of discrimination.69 Courts further
acknowledged employers had created systems of informal segregation
66. Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1306-07, affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)
67. Shultz, Telling Stories, supra note 62, at 1754.
68. Id. at 1772.
69. Id.
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through customs and implicit systems of discouragement. 70  Judicial
recognition of historical racism in the labor market led also to the
recognition that "people's aspirations have been formed in the context of
historical oppression.' Many years later, has this judicial rejection of
supposed inherent Black and White work preferences brought about
change? In short, yes. Today, it would be unthinkable for an employer to
explain away a statistically significant disparity between Black and White
workers in a particular job due to an inherent lack of Black interest.
Conversely, by accepting the proposition that some jobs are more
naturally attractive to men than women and vice versa, courts - though
not initially creating the differential interests - have successfully
perpetuated these sex-based differences, sending a message to employers
and individuals alike that differences between the sexes are real and will be
taken into account. The court in Sears, for instance, validated and vastly
extended the shelf-life of notions such as women like soft jobs and men
like hard jobs, women are friendly and men are aggressive, women like
cooperation and men like competition. Courts, accepting the "lack of
interest" argument in instances of sex-based employment discrimination,
have failed to take into account the historical exclusion of women from the
workforce, and the socialization of men and women to perform in
particularized ways; the court neglects to see all of us, men and women
alike, have formed our aspirations in the context of oppression. The law,
therefore, not only genders employment opportunities, but it perpetuates
the processes that gender us in our daily lives. We are expected to perform
our respective roles both on and off the job, and we must certainly perform
our respective roles if we hope to find romance.
B. SAME-SEX SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the
basis of "sex, 72 which has been interpreted to apply to claims of sexual
harassment "because of sex" amounting to a hostile work environment.73
But, as explained above, "sex" is not self-defining - it intersects with the
full spectrum of social signifiers. Predictably, the task of determining
when harassment is "because of sex" has left courts perplexed and divided.
How does the court determine whether someone is harassed on the basis of
sex or merely on the basis of sexuality or gender, if gender and sexuality
are both integral parts of sex?
Working within the confines of our current social identity categories,
Congress recently attempted to eliminate some of the confusion by
proposing federal workplace protections to cover adverse employment
70. Shultz, Telling Stories, supra note 62, at1772-74.
71. Id. at 1773.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (West 2009).
73. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
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actions based on "sexual orientation. 74 But, as evinced by a very public
fight over whether to also include "gender identity" in the proposed bills,
7 5
the attempts represent the same flawed thinking in which people are
differentiated and pitted against one another in the fight for rights and
power. How do we know when a trait is a signifier of sexual orientation,
sexual identity, either, neither, or both?
Recently, for example, a man in New York quit his job as a Wall Street
executive because his employer taunted him for being a vegetarian - he
claims that his boss "tormented him for being a 'homo' who wouldn't eat
steak with the boys. ' 76 Is a self-identified straight man's vegetarianism
really protected under "sexual orientation" or "gender identity?" Is meat-
eating a universal test for some vague notion of masculinity? Or could the
taunts directed at him more accurately be framed as the result of an
intersection between sex, gender identity, geographic position, socio-
economic status, race, et cetera? Quite obviously, we will likely never
know precisely which nuances of this man's identity triggered his abuse.
And yet, if Congress ultimately passes a bill (or two) protecting the
categories of "sexual orientation" and "sexual identity," courts will be
charged with bifurcating and classifying under each; in which category will
meat-eating fall? As we have seen under current Title VII sexual
harassment jurisprudence, courts tend to define social identity categories in
rigid, unnatural ways. The law's narrow understanding of when
harassment is "because of sex" is thus cause for alarm even as the
legislature hopes to expand protections.
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court finally entered the muddy
judicial debate over whether same-sex sexual harassment is actionable
under Title VII. The case is Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc.,
and it involves a male plaintiff, Joseph Oncale, who claimed male co-
workers and supervisors "restrained him while one placed his penis on
Oncale's neck and arm, threatened to rape him, and used force to 'push a
bar of soap into Oncale's anus' while he was in the shower., 77 Oncale, a
self-identifying straight man, was also subjected to verbal epithets
74. David M. Herszenhorn, House Approves Broad Protections for Gay Workers, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/08/washington/0
8employ.html?_r-l (last visited Nov 14, 2009).
75. Kerry Eleveld, ENDA to Be Separated Into Two Bills: Sexual Orientation and
Gender Identity, THE ADVOCATE, Sep. 29, 2007, available at
http://www.advocate.com/article.aspx?id=41128 (last visited Nov 14, 2009).
76. Jose Martinez, Wall Streeter Sues Employer over Vegetarian Taunts, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Jan. 29, 2009, at AI5, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/money/2009/01
/29/2009-01-29_wallstreetersues-employer.overvegetar.html (last visited Nov 14,
2009).
77. 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 523 U.S. 75 (1998); see
also Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying and Harassment "Because
of Sex, " 79 U. COLO. L. REv. 1151, 1198 (2008).
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"suggesting homosexuality., 78 Finding that same-sex sexual harassment is
actionable only if the harassment is "because of sex,"7 9 Justice Scalia,
attempting to guide lower courts as to when harassment is specifically
because of "sex" rather than some other social identity category, cautioned:
The statute does not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the
ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same
sex and of the opposite sex. The prohibition of harassment on the
basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in the
workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to
alter the "conditions" of the victim's employment. . .. We have
always regarded that requirement as crucial, and as sufficient to
ensure that courts and juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in
the workplace - such as male-on-male horseplay or intersexual
flirtation -for discriminatory "conditions of employment."80
Justice Scalia then reasoned social context must weigh heavily in the
balance. For example, in a situation in which a coach smacks a
professional football player's buttocks in the locker room before he heads
to the field, Scalia easily identifies this as not sexual harassment. 81 He
ultimately concludes the opinion by characterizing the legal determination
as one that should be obvious, stating, "[c]ommon sense, and an
appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to
distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the
same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position
would find severely hostile or abusive."
82
Following the Oncale decision, the race was on for lower courts to
begin shaping the contours of behavior amounting to "horseplay,"
"roughhousing," or "teasing," as opposed to those amounting to
harassment. Notably, in making these determinations, evidence that the
plaintiff is in fact gay or lesbian essentially serves as a complete defense
for the defendants' acts because this is sexual harassment on the basis of
"sexual orientation" and not on the basis of "sex." 83 This, however, ignores
78. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 77.
79. Id. at 80.
80. Id. at 81 (emphasis added).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 82 (emphasis added).
83. See McGinley, supra note 77, at 1156-57. (McGinley notes that one typical scenario
of same-sex sexual harassment claims involves harassment by men against other men who
do not present themselves as sufficiently masculine, and that courts disagree as to whether
these men have a cause of action if they identify as gay. She further notes that even those
courts acknowledging that discrimination based on gender nonconformity may constitute a
valid cause of action, if the plaintiff identifies as gay, most grant summary judgment to the
defendant because their harassment was because of the plaintiff's perceived sexual
orientation and not sex). Id. at 1156-57, n.18. See also, e.g., Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr.,
453 F.3d 757, 763-65 (6th Cir. 2006) (Finding that the plaintiff alleged only sexual
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the obvious reality that people have been trained to recognize real maleness
and femaleness in terms of whether a sexed body comports with perceived
or actual sexual identity. The following is a small sample of how several
courts have bifurcated sexuality and sex, and how they have defined
acceptable and unacceptable maleness (and, to a much lesser extent,
femaleness). 4
In Spearman v. Ford Motor Co., the Seventh Circuit found sexually
explicit remarks made amongst male co-workers - including comments in
which one co-worker called another a "little bitch," told him he hated his
"gay ass," and threatened to go to his home and "fuck [his] gay faggot ass
up" - was not harassment because of sex, but "simply expressions of
animosity or juvenile provocation." 85 In Johnson v. Hondo, the Seventh
Circuit again ruled against the male plaintiff, finding the statement, "I am
going to make you suck my dick," and the insults, "punk," "faggot," "fag"
and "s.o.b.," amounted to "nothing other than vulgar provocations having
no causal relationship to [plaintiffs] gender as a male., 86 In King v. Super
Serv., Inc., the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found men who called
another man various names for "homosexual," suggested he wanted to
perform oral sex on them, and grabbed, punched, and kicked him were
engaged in male "horseplay," not harassment on the basis of sex.87  In
Linville v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found a male's repeated "backhanding" of his male co-worker's scrotum
while laughing was not harassment on the basis of sex, but instead was
"crude, gender-specific vulgarity" and horseplay. 88 And in Mann v. Lima,
the Rhode Island District Court found a woman's repeated sexualized
comments and actions directed at another female co-worker - comments
about her physical appearance and her jewelry (wanting to both buy
orientation discrimination even though there was an explicit allegation of gender
stereotyping and facts that suggested that his harassment occurred because he was not
sufficiently masculine.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1104 (2007).
84. To understand how the courts have used sexual harassment law to define femaleness
as passive, well mannered, and chaste, an in-depth analysis of male-to-female sexual
harassment cases would be necessary. This, however, is a task exceeding the scope of this
Article. See, e.g., Loftin-Boggs v. City of Meridian, Miss., 633 F. Supp. 1323, 1327 (1986):
Plaintiff admitted at trial that she cursed and used vulgar language while at
work. According to the testimony of her co-workers, plaintiff often made
jokes about sex and participated in frequent discussions and bantering about
sex. Any harassment plaintiff received relating to her relationship with
[defendant] was prompted by her own actions, including her tasteless joking.
Considering plaintiffs contribution to and apparent enjoyment of the
situation, it cannot be said that the defendants created 'an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
85. 231 F.3d 1080, 1082, 1085 (7th Cir, 2000) (citing Johnson v. Hondo, 125 F.3d 408,
412 (7th Cir. 1997)).
86. 125 F.3d at 410-11,413.
87. 68 F. App'x. 659, 660-61, 664 (6th Cir. 2003).
88. 335 F.3d 822, 824 (8th Cir. 2003).
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jewelry for her and take off what she was currently wearing), and her
touching and massaging motions - did not amount to harassment on the
basis of sex, but was merely "unwelcome, tasteless, inappropriate, and
unprofessional."89
What "because of sex" means is a hot legal issue with an ambiguous
answer. What is clear, however, is "because of sex" does not mean
horseplay, vulgarity, mere offensiveness, or an agenda to harm members of
the queer community. These things, it seems, are just natural parts of men
being men. The courts, in their construction of the "because of sex"
requirement, have defined masculinity and femininity in opposition to each
other. Masculinity embodies aggressive, dominant behavior in which men
are constantly engaged in a hierarchical battle for power over each other
and over those whom they perceive to be weaker (women, gender non-
conforming men, and queer men). When the victim is (assumed) straight,
the harassing "behavior - taunting, pinching, grabbing of male genitalia,
and other forms of horseplay ... establishes the masculine norms for the
group and the job," and thus dictates the behavior necessary to achieve and
maintain power.
90
When the victim is perceived to be gay or gender non-conforming, the
harassing behavior is punishment for non-conformity to gender roles, and
that punishment solidifies the perpetrator's status as the holder of
masculinity and power. 9 Femininity, conversely, is in part defined as
being friendly, complimentary, and accessible to some physical
manifestations of same-sex affection. The general tone of courts' treatment
of female-to-female sexual harassment suggests same-sex hugging and
light touching are germane to femaleness, and, while inappropriate in
certain contexts, is certainly not "harassment." Conversely, similar
behavior in a male would likely result in summary judgment for the victim
due to the perpetrator's assumed gay status.
The courts' general constructions of "because of sex" as a concept
divorced from considerations of gender and sexual orientation likely have
profound effects on our intimate preferences, particularly those who
intimately prefer men. This jurisprudence has contributed to our
89. Mann v. Lima, 290 F. Supp. 2d 190, 191-92, 198 (D. Ri. 2003). For more examples
of the courts' interpretation of men being men and women being women, see, e.g., McCown
v. St. John's Health Sys., 349 F.3d 540, 544 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that, although the
conduct was inappropriate and vulgar, it was not based on sex); Bianchi v. City of
Philadelphia, 183 F. Supp. 2d 726, 736 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (finding that the conduct might have
been the result of one of four things, including horseplay, and found that the harassment was
not because of sex); Weston v. Co. of PA, 2001 WL 1491132, 11 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding
that, "while the actions of his supervisors and/or the co-worker may be unprofessional and
juvenile, especially when directed toward a gentleman who is obviously sensitive regarding
the actions of [defendant] and offended by the teasing, they do not give rise to a viable claim
of sex harassment under Title VII").
90. See McGinley, supra note 77, at 1157.
91. Id.
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understanding of real men as masculine and masculinity as power-centric,
forceful, and even brutish. Real men engage in violent and crude horseplay
with each other, grabbing each other's genitals (never for sexual pleasure),
demeaning each other with sexualized insults, and picking on gay or
effeminate men. And, unlike real women - who, according to courts,
should not mind same-sex touching and flattery - real men must not
fondly touch or complement each other lest their claims be dismissed as
non-actionable harassment because of sexual orientation. Thus, for any
person who claims an intimate preference for masculine (or "straight-
acting") men, the courts have provided us with a prepackaged conception
of what this type of man acts like. And as long as "men" continues to be a
term that is defined relative to the amount of power wielded, those who
intimately prefer them (either because of or in spite of this power) tend to
be positioned unequally within the relationship's hierarchy. The result is a
compromise of our dignity and a lack of free choice.
C. EMPLOYER GROOMING AND DRESS CODES
In addition to reifying and creating group-based differences between
the activities we prefer and the ways in which we perform "sex," the law in
the employment context has also set us apart on the basis of our
appearance. In validating employers' disparate grooming and dress codes
for men and women, courts have not only shamelessly perpetuated perhaps
the most blatant remaining form of gender discrimination in the
workforce,92 but have also shaped American society's expectations for men
and women's outward appearance. "[W]ith some exceptions, the law
authorizes employers to determine the kinds of clothing people must, may,
or may not wear on the job; which hair styles and other appearance
practices are permitted and which are forbidden in the workplace; and
whether to impose appearance or attractiveness standards as a condition of
employment., 93  These legal rules reflect assumptions, fantasies, and
prejudices, and also direct "which values are served and which are
demeaned by the complex of social practices comprising appearance
regulation., 94 How individuals, and society at large, view people while at
work is not an isolated sensory experience capable of quarantine from our
other person-classifying mechanisms. Our images of male and female
workers stay with us long after we are off the clock, creating difference in
the ways in which we expect particularly sexed bodies to dress and present
in all contexts.
92. Zimmer et al., supra note 10, at 350 (noting that "different grooming codes or
appearance standards for men and women have routinely been upheld by the courts, despite
being facially discriminatory").
93. Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG.
L. REv. 1395 (1992).
94. Id.
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Although differential dress and grooming standards for men and
women are facially discriminatory, courts have carved unique legal
doctrines out of Title VII analysis in an effort to uphold them. Established
in the 1970s against the backdrop of an American society still firmly
entrenched in overt sexism and patriarchy,95 the legal rule that emerged
during early grooming and dress code litigation is that such codes may
distinguish between men and women on the basis of "commonly accepted
social norms ' 96 or "generally accepted community standards of dress and
appearance." 97  But how do courts decide which social norms are
commonly or generally accepted, and why does it not matter that these
norms and standards have been created under artificial conditions of
oppression, exclusion, and misogyny fueled by other institutions, including
the law itself? Rather than ascertaining whether these norms reflect archaic
and stereotypic notions of male and female roles, courts - largely
influenced and controlled by a world dominated by heterosexual men -
decline critical analysis and instead inject their own sensibilities, thus
perpetuating and further creating the male-female dichotomy of grooming
and dress.
One of the earliest grooming and dress code cases brought under Title
VII, Willingham v. Macon Tel. Pub. Co., concerned an employer's
disparate standards for male and female hair length. 98 Macon, a newspaper
company, believed the business community it served looked unfavorably
on males with long hair because of their presumed representation of a
"counter-culture" invested in drugs, partial nudity, and political pacifism.99
The company enacted a grooming code requiring all employees who came
into contact with the public "to be neatly dressed and groomed in
accordance with the standards customarily accepted in the business
community, which was interpreted to exclude the employing of men (but
not women) with long hair."100 In concluding the discrimination alleged
was not based on "sex" or "gender stereotypes" but merely on an entirely
separate sphere of "grooming standards," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reasoned, "a hiring policy that distinguishes on... grooming codes or
length of hair is related more closely to the employer's choice of how to
95. See Klare, supra note 93, at 1417.
96. Carroll v. Talman Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980).
97. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975).
Notably, courts have used the same or similar standards when evaluating other legal regimes
that regulate the ways in which men and women must dress in public. See, e.g., Luke A.
Boso, A (Trans)Gender-Inclusive Equal Protection Analysis of Public Female Toplessness,
18 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1 (2009) (exposing the inconsistencies and inherent sexism in
courts' application of "community standards" in upholding laws permitting male toplessness
but not female toplessness).
98. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. at 1087.
100. Id.
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run his business than to equality of employment opportunity." 10' The court
then offered advice to those male employees who do not conform to the
generally accepted norms of male hair length: look elsewhere for
employment or, alternatively, "subordinate his preference by accepting the
code along with the job."
' 102
While Willingham does not directly implicate overt deep-seated notions
of masculinity and femininity inherent in employer grooming codes visible
in subsequent cases, it is interesting nonetheless for three reasons. First, it
validates community standards that reflected, at the time, strong anti-hippie
sentiment. A prominent, though perhaps not often articulated, theme
regarding animus towards the hippie movement was distaste for men who
oppose war and violence. War and violence, inherently byproducts of
power hierarchies, have been and continue to be constructed as
quintessentially male institutions, where "the military constructs warriors
as male and masculine, relying on rites of institution that test the identity of
individual men as masculine, while reinforcing solidarity of men as a
group.' 0 3 Thus, though subtle, the law's validation of disparate hair length
standards for men and women does, in part, reinforce and perpetuate
particular understandings of male power and masculinity. Second, by
bifurcating sex and gender-based discrimination from allegedly benign
business decisions, the court disregards the reality of business decisions
made precisely because of sexist clientele preferences.10 4 Third, the court
forecloses a space for individuality and fluidity in our appearance-based
sex performances by explicitly endorsing subordination.
Today, community standards and social norms, in a very broad sense,
have changed from how courts viewed them in the 1970s. Various
women's and gay rights groups have succeeded, at the very least, in
broadening societal understandings of identity and challenging roles rooted
in tradition. The legal emergence of sex stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse1°5 as an anti-discrimination principle, for example, is a tangible
example of at least a small shift in social mores. Yet, even as some
boundaries blur, others hold tightly. Employers, validated by the courts,
continue to police and reinforce sex, despite the ever-increasing number of
people who openly identify as something other than simply man or woman,
gay or straight (take, for instance, people identifying as transsexual,
101. Willingham, 507 F.2dat 1091.
102. Id..
103. See Valorie K. Vojdik, The Invisibility of Gender In War, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 261, 266 (2002).
104. But see Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (D.C. Tex. 1981)
(rejecting Southwest's female-only flight attendant policy, and reasoning that "customer
preference could 'be taken into account only when it is based on the company's inability to
perform the primary function or service it offers,' that is, where sex or sex appeal is itself
the dominant service provided") (internal citations omitted).
105. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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transgendered, inter-sexed, bisexual, queer, fern, butch, or metrosexual).
Appearance law remains disciplinary - "it enforces (usually indirectly,
through employer power) social norms regarding proper behavior. In
particular, the law empowers employers to insist that employees conform to
socially constructed norms and expectations about how the sexes should act
and look[, and] [e]mployers may punish people who challenge or deviate
from prevailing norms." 10 6 In light of the increasing elasticity in the
understanding of women's roles and their employment opportunities, and
the widening umbrella of social identity categories and the various
performative aspects associated with each, what then happens to those in
the workplace who appear to fall outside of the traditional sex binary?
One modem example of tradition's stronghold on appropriate physical
appearance is Jespersen v. Harrah's Operation Company, Inc.
07
Jespersen is a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in which the court
held a casino's sex-differentiated grooming policy did not violate Title VII.
The casino's dress and grooming policy laid out the following sex-specific
requirements: male employees must wear their hair short and trim their
fingernails, and they must not wear makeup or nail polish; female
employees must wear their hair "teased, curled, or styled," as well as wear
stockings, colored nail polish, and specific types of facial makeup outlined
by an "image consultant. '" 10 8 Darlene Jespersen was a longtime, well-
respected employee at the casino, but she objected to the female grooming
and dress requirements, arguing they amounted to sex discrimination under
Title VII. The court disagreed, finding they imposed "different but
essentially equal burdens on men and women" and did not amount to
disparate treatment, reasoning that "[g]rooming standards that
appropriately differentiate between the genders are not facially
discriminatory."1'0 9
By upholding the grooming and dress policy at issue here, the Ninth
Circuit now has a hand in actually creating real differences in the ways in
which society expects men and women to look. By making these
differences salient, the court further opened the door to punish - by
denying opportunities to, or ridiculing - those who do not meet the
standards of that image. This punishment comes not only from employers,
but from our friends, family, and potential intimate partners. The court also
successfully reinforces a gender hierarchy:
106. Klare, supra note 93, at 1420.
107. 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
108. Id. at 1107, 1114. See also Joanna L. Grossman, Sex-Stereotyping and Dress Codes
under Title VII Why Courts Can't Get it Right, FiNDLAW, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/grossman/20090303.html (last visited Nov 14, 2009).
109. Jesperson, 444 F.3d at 1109-10. The court, quite amazingly, declined to take
judicial notice that the female requirements impose a much greater cost and take more time
than do the male requirements.
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[I]n which a working woman is evaluated on both appearance and
job performance. The requirement that women must wear leg-
revealing business dresses or skirts, for instance, is not innocuous.
(Nor is the burden of a working woman's need for a costly, varied
wardrobe when a man can get away with a few nearly-identical
business suits). Dress codes serve to emphasize gender




That gender hierarchy, in turn, continually plays itself out on the dating
market by imposing greater hurdles and expectations on women seeking
intimate relationships. Those women who resist being evaluated on
appearance, and who attempt to limit their exposure to objectification, are
often branded as undesirable, cold, or lesbians.
While the costs are high for the man or woman who does not dress or
groom sufficiently sex-typical, what are the costs for the person whose
social identity category is premised on gender non-conformity or the
rejection of biological sex? Recently, in Creed v. Family Exp. Corp.,
111
Ms. Amber Creed - a person who was designated at birth as a male but
who is transgendered - found out. Creed worked for Family Express as a
sales associate, and, during her tenure, she began to assume a more
traditionally feminine rather than masculine look (she wore her hair longer
and applied makeup and nail polish). 12 She was ultimately fired because
she violated Creed's grooming and dress code, which requires "males to
maintain neat and conservative hair that is kept above the collar and
prohibits earrings or any other jewelry that accompanies body piercing."
'1 13
Rejecting Ms. Creed's argument that "Family Express discriminated
against her based on her sex by terminating her for failure to comply with
male stereotypes in violation of Title VII, ' ' 1 4 the court found the grooming
policy valid because it equally burdens both sexes. The court further found
Family Express did not discriminate against Ms. Creed on the basis of sex,
noting, "Ms. Creed might argue that real-life experience as a member of the
female gender is an inherent part of her non-conforming gender behavior,
such that Family Express's dress code and grooming policy discriminates
on the basis of her transgender status, but rightly or wrongly, Title VII's
prohibition on sex discrimination doesn't extend so far."" 
5
The law has thus placed transgendered and transsexual persons in a
paradox and perpetual state of ambiguity. For a person born, for example,
110. Grossman, supra, note 108.
111. No. 3:06-CV-465RM, 2009, U.S. Dist. WL 35237, *1 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 5, 2009).
112. Id. at *2.
113. Id.
114. Id. at *5.
115. Id. at *10.
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a "biological male" but who intuitively knows being "male" is somehow
the wrong designation, what options are available in terms of how to
express themselves through appearance? According to the courts, they
must choose to appear as one or the other. But if they make the wrong
choice (the choice contrary to the designation on their birth), they will be
punished. Accordingly, the law has solidified the common belief that one
either is a male or is a female and must look as such - creating distinct
differences between the two, refusing to allow male and female to ever
transcend each other, and strictly limiting our potential for sexual
expression and solidarity.
D. MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL REGIMES
As demonstrated above, the employment context is brimming with
examples of the law's far-reaching power to create and assign meanings to
categories of social identity. But laws regulating employment are only a
small sample of the vast legal machinery at work to create sex, gender, and
sexual identity based differences. While pinpointing all inceptions of
legally created difference is a project far exceeding the scope of this
Article, I will briefly mention at least a few.
What about, for instance, laws regulating the military? What does the
law excluding openly gay men and women from serving in the military
teach us about what it means to be a man or a woman, masculine or
feminine?1 16 If the military is an institution equated with power, and power
is only offered to those who identify as straight (it is hardly disputable that
"homosexual activities" currently occur between people in the military, and
not all persons who engage in them are discharged), then the message we
learn and internalize is that to identify as gay is to somehow exhibit a
weakness not possessed by those who identify as straight. This is an
integral part of the process by which many men and women learn to
suppress and stamp out any potential they have to experience intimate
desire for another person of the same sex. It is part of the process by which
people act out in homophobic ways to differentiate themselves from "those
people" and secure their positions in the social order. 1 7 It is a survival
116. See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (West 2009).
117. See Valorie K. Vojdik, Gender Outlaws: Challenging Masculinity in Traditionally
Male Institutions, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L. J. 68, 91 (2002) [hereinafter Vojdik, Gender
Outlaws]. As Professor Vojdik explains:
[M]asculinity is not fixed, but rather is relational, created by and through its
opposition to femininity. In practice, masculinity is "constructed in front of
us, and for the benefit of, other men and against femininity." . . . Practices
such as gang rapes, for example, challenge men to prove their virility
through violence and their denial of gentle or "feminine" qualities. The
group harassment of men who are perceived to be effeminate or homosexual
is another powerful rite that marks "real" men from homosexuals and
women. Men who fail these tests or refuse to participate in these rituals are
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mechanism perceived as necessary in a world in which one's positions in
life and in love in many ways relate to how much power one holds.
Further, what do laws excluding women from military institutions of
higher education," 8 or from the majority of combat positions, teach us
about women's position in the social hierarchy, their expected sex-gender
performance, and their value as individuals? In defending these all-male
exclusionary policies, military institutions have previously argued women
are not suited for combat or for military-style education because they lack
qualities such as "aggressiveness, 'fanaticism,' strength, and [the] self-
confidence of men."'1 19 The law's historical embrace of these justifications
helps to create the very "social process of exclusion that distinguishes
persons based on their sex, simultaneously reinforcing a hierarchy that
privileges the male and masculinity, and subordinates women. '120 We
internalize the belief that women are, after all, inferior to men, and that
women are best suited to less competitive and domineering roles. This
internalized belief in the superiority of maleness and masculinity translates
into unequal bargaining power in intimate relationships. To be a straight
man is partially constructed as being one who exercises power over
another. A man who intimately prefers women, then, has an intimate
preference that includes a skewed power dynamic resulting from a system
in which men presume an inherent position of authority over women.
Women too have internalized these meanings, often behaving in ways to
reinforce male superiority, such as seeking a male "provider" or
"protector," assuming the male surname or voluntarily overtaking domestic
tasks. In this context, the law's construction of maleness and femaleness as
opposing forces, consequently contributes to intimate preferences in which
we seek inequality of roles rather than equality.
Another difference-creating area of the law, currently hot for public
debate, is marriage. The popular conservative framing of marriage, and
one a majority of Americans accept as valid,121 is that marriage is between
a "man" and a "woman." Through legislation, state constitutional
amendments, and judicial opinions, the law tends to reflect this
conservative framing. This construction of marriage as between a man and
woman contributes to the flawed, rigid conception of "male" and "female"
relegated to the "typically female category of 'wimps,' 'girlies,' and
'fairies."'
118. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996), and Faulkner v. Jones, 51
F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that military institutes' all-male enrollment policy violated
the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause).
119. See Vojdik, Gender Outlaws, supra note 117, at 69 (internal citations omitted).
120. Id. at 74.
121. CBS Poll: Changing Views on Gay Marriage, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/20
08/06/13/opinion/polls/main4l80335.shtml?source-mostpop-story (last visited Nov. 14,
2009) (finding that only thirty percent of Americans support the right of gays and lesbians to
marry their same-sex partners).
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as a bifurcated system of sex based on real biological differences. What
happens to the transgendered, transsexual, or inter-sexed person who seeks
to marry their intimate partner? Courts addressing this issue have been
forced to define our categories of sex-identity, and they have - not
surprisingly - done so narrowly. To determine a person's "sex" for the
purposes of marriage, courts have relied on the term's "plain meaning," and
they place heavy evidentiary emphasis on gonads, chromosomes, and
genitals.1 22 In refusing to acknowledge the concept of sex as an idea with
far greater social meaning than a person's biological makeup, one Texas
court said of a transgendered plaintiff:
Through surgery and hormones, a transsexual male can be made to
look like a woman, including female genitalia and breasts ...
[But] [t]he male chromosomes do not change with either hormonal
treatment or sex reassignment surgery. Biologically, a post
operative female transsexual is still a male .... Her female
anatomy, however, is all man-made.
1 23
The court's construction of sex as static and immutable represents a
formalistic, science-based approach to identity that entirely dismisses
individuality and removes any real possibility for choice; courts impose
their perceptions of a person's identity, eviscerating that person's
autonomy. We are all more than our biology, but to be relegated into boxes
this way certainly limits our current categories of intimate preference.
The law also affirmatively creates categories of sexual identity by
expressly imposing costs on sex-atypical (gay) behavior. These costs both
punish current non-conforming behavior and deter potential future rogues.
Thus, for members of the queer community, survival strategies have
surfaced, resulting in the "straight-acting gay identity." For instance,
because courts sometimes deny custody to an openly gay parent, family
law encourages parents to "do everything possible to hide one's sexual
orientation from a former spouse" to avoid giving courts a reason to deny
custody.1 24 The law "also encourages straight acting in negative and far
more ubiquitous ways by failing to constrain private discrimination"
against homosexuality in work environments; as this Article went to print,
thirty states offer no anti-discrimination workplace protections for
members of the queer community. 25 And finally, the failure of the police
and prosecutors to deal with violence - pervasive in even the most
progressive parts of the United States - against those who are perceived as
122. See, e.g., Kantras v. Kantras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); In re Estate
of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex, App.
1999); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6 (Ohio Prob. Ct. 1987).
123. 9 S.W.3d at 230-31.
124. See Carpenter, supra note 54, at 811.
125. Id.
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gay has also contributed to straight-acting behavior. 126  Without legal
deterrents, the queer person's safety from physical danger depends entirely
on her ability to "cover."
The discussion above is intended to highlight many of the ways in
which the law creates difference and constructs our categories of intimate
preference, but there are countless others. Nonetheless, disruption must
begin somewhere. By placing these trouble spots in the limelight, perhaps
it has already begun.
V. CONCLUSION
Intimate discrimination means different things to different people. To
some, intimate discrimination does not exist; whom we choose in matters
of love is an intensely private and complicated process, far removed from
legalistic conceptions of "rights" and "autonomy." These decisions are not
matters of choice we can submit for debate- our intimate preferences are
innate parts of who we are, and we are powerless to change them. Still, to
others, intimate discrimination is very real, and it is personally experienced
and executed continuously throughout life. It may be deeply rooted in
prejudices, stereotypes, and even outright hatred. Though these meanings
reflect very different strains of thought, both, in a way, are correct. We, as
individuals, can likely do little to change or "choose" our most basic
intimate sexual preferences. But those basic preferences exist within a
system fraught with categories and meanings contingent on prejudice,
stereotypes, and even hatred. Understood differently, then, intimate
discrimination is the institutional processes by which the categories and
correlating meanings that influence our preferences are created. To create
a tangible remedy for intimate discrimination, then, is to disrupt these
institutional processes by, for instance, demanding just legal machinery
committed to analyzing the origins of difference rather than creating and
often punishing it.
The ways in which the law constructs social identity are premised on
the fundamental belief in power as a virtue. These constructions have
come to embody rigid hierarchies in which certain categories of people are
positioned more favorably than others due to the amount of perceived
power they possess. We, in turn, have had little choice but to internalize
these differences and meanings through our natural learning processes.
Because we currently choose intimate partners who map onto particular,
illusory identity categories, and those categories are fundamentally
unequal, we have come to eroticize power imbalances and cyclically
contribute to our own subordination even amongst our lovers. It is for
these reasons (and more) that disrupting the legal institution's difference-
creating processes is a viable and desirable tactic to end intimate
126. Carpenter, supra note 54, at 811-12.
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discrimination. This disruption will allow individual actors to define
themselves, thus paving the way for others to seek out people as individuals
rather than as a bundle of manufactured ideas of what people should be.
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